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Abstract This article begins with a brief introductory account of the vicissitudes of the 
academic studies on extraordinary capacities. Thereafter, the stereotyped passages in 
which iddhi and abhiññā occur as a meditative attainment achieved within a Buddhist path 
of liberation are presented and the interpretation of these two terms is discussed. After 
these preparatory opening remarks, the Vedic background of iddhi and abhiññā is treated 
with regards to three aspects. First, the speculative idea sustained by some scholars that 
would see the body made of mind (manomaya-kāya) as the base and tool to perform 
iddhis and abhiññās is discussed on the basis of the Vedic evidence. Secondly, the term 
‘divine’ (dibba) that occurs in the description of some abhiññās is compared with the use 
of the corresponding Vedic terms and with the Vedic idea of a divine power behind the 
functioning of the faculties. Finally, the abhiññā called ‘the knowledge of degeneration and 
ascent of beings’ (cutūpapātañāṇa) is compared with a couple of narratives involving the 
oneiric state within the Upaniṣads, showing some similarities between the two accounts.
Keywords Buddhism. Pāli. Veda. Upaniṣad. Iddhi. Abhiññā. Manomaya-kāya.
Summary 1 Preliminary Remarks. – 2 Introduction. – 3 The Pericopes of iddhis and 
other abhiññās. – 4 Interpretation of the Terms iddhi and abhiññā. – 5 The Vedic Back-
ground: Three Case Studies. – 5.1 A Glance into the Vedic Background in Order to Solve 
a Problem. – 5.2 The Term ‘Divine’ (Pāli: dibba; Sanskrit: divya/daiva): What is There Be-
hind the Linguistic Similarity? – 5.3 The Observation of the Action of Kamma (Sanskrit: 
Karman): A Faint Echo. – 6 Conclusion.
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1 Preliminary remarks
The terms iddhi and abhiññā are used in the Pāli canon to designate ex-
traordinary capacities, namely kinds of remarkable abilities and knowl-
edges mostly attained during the path of awakening. At first glance, 
the decision to deal with iddhis and abhiññās separately may seem a 
little arbitrary. For instance, on many occasions in the Pāli canon the 
iddhis are regarded as part of abhiññās’ classification, namely, iddhis 
are regarded as the first abhiññā. This is evident from the compound 
chaḷabhiññā ‘endowed with the six abhiññās’1 and from other similar ex-
pressions, such as: cha abhiññā (the six abhiññās; D, III, 281).2 However, 
it should be highlighted that the word abhiññā does not appear within 
the exposition of the extraordinary capacities in the Sāmaññaphalasutta 
(D, 2), whereas the word iddhi is present. In the Dīghanikāya, a reference 
to the six abhiññās occurs in the Dasuttarasutta (D, 34; cf. D, III, 281), 
a proto-Abhidhammic text. From the point of view of the Dīghanikāya, 
the integration of iddhis within the group of the other abhiññās al-
most appears as a later development since only Dasuttarasutta men-
tions it. Moreover, although it seems that there has already been a es-
tablished tendency in the Pāli canon to group together iddhis and the 
other abhiññās, there are examples from some texts later than the four 
principal nikāyas (Dīgha-, Majjhima-, Saṃyutta-, Aṅguttara-) that dem-
onstrate that the Buddhist tradition has kept iddhis and abhiññās sep-
arated as well.3 Therefore, the Paṭisambhidāmagga devotes a chapter 
to the iddhis (iddhi-kathā; Paṭi, II, 205-14), and the Visuddhimagga de-
votes a chapter to the iddhis (iddhividhā-niddesa; Vism, 373-406) and 
another chapter to the other abhiññās (abhiññā-niddesa; Vism, 407-35).
An earlier version of this paper was written during a period of stay at the University of 
Bristol (January-July 2018) under the supervision of Prof. Rupert Gethin. The Author 
first presented it at the 23rd Joint Postgraduate Conference on Theology and Religion, 
University of Exeter, 28 April 2018. He is grateful to his doctoral supervisor, Prof. Al-
berto Pelissero, and his co-supervisor, Prof. Andrea Drocco, for the help and suggestions 
he received. He wishes to thank Indaka Weerasekera for a final glance on the preprint 
version of the paper. Last but not least, he is also strongly indebted to Prof. Giuliano 
Giustarini, whose remarks drove him to improve his work. It goes without saying that 
all remaining errors are his own responsibility. All translations from Pāli and Sanskrit 
are his own unless otherwise noted.
1 This compound appears, for instance, in S, I, 191; Vin, II, 161; Pug, 14 (quoted also 
in PED, 57, s.v. “abhiññā”, which, however, made a mistake writing ‘Vin, II, 16’, where-
as the right reference is ‘Vin, II, 161’).
2 There is also mention in the Pāli texts of an enumeration of five abhiññās: pañcan-
nam abhiññānam (S, II, 216).
3 A widespread canonical reference of abhiññās that does not include iddhis is the 
notion of ‘three knowledges’ (tisso vijjā, often also in the adjectival form tevijja ‘hav-
ing three knowledges’) which includes only the last three abhiññās of the six-abhiññās 
(chaḷabhiññā) systematisation. Some scholars regard the notion of ‘three knowledges’ 
older than chaḷabhiññā, in this regard see Endo 1997, 17 and Gómez [2010] 2011, 515.
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2 Introduction
In the field of the study of Indian religions, the analysis of the extraor-
dinary capacities achievable through the practice of meditation is a 
topic that still needs a thorough examination. For instance, it was not-
ed by David G. White that the third chapter of the Yogasūtra, which 
deals with the supernatural powers of yogis, “has historically been the 
least studied portion of that text, in spite of the fact that it compris-
es over one fourth of the entire work” (2012, 61). It is possible to state 
that the study of extraordinary capacities has had a fluctuating trend 
throughout the centuries since in the early XX century, at the begin-
ning of the study of yoga traditions, some scholars attempted to as-
sociate the study of yoga powers with the results achieved in psycho-
logical research (such as hypnosis) in the hope to improve our insight 
into human capacities. This tendency survived until studies on these 
psychological phenomena were carried out by universities.4 Moreover, 
the progressive affirmation of a secularising tendency has resulted in 
a gradual abandonment of this kind of research and, indeed, it is pos-
sible to identify a certain embarrassement on the part of scholars in 
dealing with these extraordinary powers.5 In recent times, it seems 
that the study of miracles and extraordinary powers has once again be-
come popular and, therefore, works on this argument have been pub-
lished recently.6 Until now, the trend towards extraordinary capaci-
ties with reference to Indian religions in general has been exposed, but 
what can we say about the general trend in Buddhist studies? It can 
be argued that, despite notable exceptions, the general trend that be-
came established was the same tendency that occurred for the study 
of the broader field of Indian religions:7
4 According to Kripal (2007, 183; see also Jacobsen 2012, 13), a change in the psycho-
logical studies was due to the emergence of behaviourism.
5 For a more detailed sketch on the attitude towards the study of yoga powers, see 
Jacobsen 2012, 12-16.
6 This new trend is confirmed by: 1) the renewed commitment of the universities, most 
notably, the doctoral thesis of David V. Fiordalis (2008); 2) the commitment of journals, 
such as volume 33 of the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 
([2010] 2011), which dedicated six articles to the study of miracles and superhuman 
powers in Buddhist traditions; 3) the publication of miscellanies, such as the volume 
edited by Knut A. Jacobsen Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities Attained Through 
Meditation and Concentration (Leiden: Boston 2012), which deals with the study of yo-
ga powers within many different traditions in different ages.
7 Remarkable exceptions are, for instance, Demiéville (1927), La Vallé Poussin (1931), 
Conze (1952), French (1977). It is maybe thanks to maverick authors like these that the 
study of extraordinary phenomena started gradually to gain importance within the ac-
ademia. For example, according to Gómez “[w]e owe it to Prof. Edward Conze to have 
contributed positively to break the spell of ‘Buddhist rationalism’ among Western stu-
dents of the Buddhist texts, when he insisted, in his Buddhism: Its Essence and Devel-
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The attempt to marginalize the practice of miraculous powers in 
the earliest Buddhist texts must be considered a feature of Bud-
dhist modernism, and related to the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century preoccupation with recovering a historical Bud-
dha congenial to the rationalist and ethical sensitivities of certain 
Buddhist apologists. (Gethin 2011, 223)8
This tendency may have affected a huge number of scholars since 
the preoccupation towards the performance of miraculous powers 
flowed into the writing of the lemma ‘iddhi’ within the Pāli-English 
Dictionary. Therefore, after the exposition of ten kinds of power, it 
is reported that
[t]here is no valid evidence that any one of the ten iddhis in the 
above list actually took place. A few instances are given, but all 
are in texts more than a century later than the recorded wonder. 
And now for nearly two thousand years we have no further in-
stances. (PED, 107)
This last passage seems to reveal a certain anxiety towards pow-
ers as if to say to the reader to not take them too seriously.9 Howev-
er, the attitude of the Buddhist tradition towards the extraordinary 
capacities is exactly the opposite since these powers are treated as 
something that really exists and so needs regulation. Therefore, the 
monastic code, the Vinaya, contains some rules to regulate the per-
formance and the attitude towards them. Hence, in the Cullavagga 
section of the Vinaya, the Buddha forbids monks to exhibit and flaunt 
the superhuman miracle of powers in front of lay people.10 On anoth-
er occasion, it is stated that claiming to have experienced the super-
human phenomena when it is not true is an offence that results in 
opment, on the compatibility and frequent coexistence of magical belief and Buddhist 
philosophy” (1977, 221).
8 A similar kind of rationalistic approach affected the study of Indian philosophy in 
general: “[t]he promoters of the study of Indian philosophy often saw it as their job to 
emphasize the rational in Indian traditions against a Eurocentrism that saw rationali-
ty and philosophy mainly as an exclusively Western phenomenon” (Jacobsen 2012, 14).
9 The same attitude was also noted by Harold W. French, who wrote that “[t]he texts 
themselves indicate different perspectives toward iddhi and modern interpreters ex-
hibit the same tendency. Some, notably the Rhys Davids’ and Oldenberg, seem embar-
rassed by the references, which are not insignificant, and are inclined to minimize the 
import of iddhi in the tradition” (1977, 42). Here, French is referring to both Mr. And 
Mrs. Rhys Davids and it is worth noting that Mr. Rhys Davids was one of the redactors 
of the Pāli-English Dictionary.
10 na bhikkhave gihīnaṃ uttarimanussadhammaṃ iddhipāṭihāriyaṃ dassetabbaṃ. 
(Vin, II, 112)
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the expulsion from the Monastic order.11 Moreover, the attainment 
of extraordinary capacities is also reported in a stereotyped account 
of the path of liberation, which is fully explained in the Pāli texts, 
for instance, in the Sāmaññaphalasutta, the sutta number two of the 
Dīghanikāya.12 In this account, it is stated that a monk, after having 
cultivated morality, abandons the five hindrances (pañca-nīvaraṇa) 
and attains ever deeper meditative absorption states ( jhāna) until 
the fourth level of absorption. Thereafter, he directs the mind (citta) 
for the sake of knowing and seeing (ñāṇa-dassana), discovering that 
the body is impermanent and that the consciousness (viññāṇa) is at-
tached to it. After raising awareness into the very nature of body and 
consciousness, the monk is able to create a new body made of mind 
(manomaya). At this point, the text lists a set of extraordinary capaci-
ties which culminate in the achievement of liberation. In later system-
atisations these capacities are called the six abhiññās (chaḷabhiññā), 
which consist of iddhis, in addition to the other five abhiññās.
3 The Pericopes of iddhis and Other abhiññās
After the creation of the body made of mind, the attainment of the 
extraordinary capacities is reported. These are listed hierarchically 
since the ending words that divide the attainments from each other 
state: “Oh Great King, this also is a visible fruit of the homeless life 
which is more advanced and exalted than the previous ones”.13 The 
first pericope (or formulaic expression) that appears in this regard 
is a set of iddhis that the monk is able to perform:
When the mind is concentrated in this way, purified, cleaned, un-
blemished, freed from impurities, malleable, fit for work, stead-
fast, having attained impassibility, he directs and turns the mind 
to the variety of iddhis. He experiences variety of iddhis in many 
ways: having been one he becomes many, having been many he 
becomes one, he becomes manifested, he becomes concealed, he 
11 yo pana bhikkhu anabhijānaṃ uttarimanussadhammaṃ attūpanāyikaṃ 
alamariyañāṇadassanaṃ samudācareyya iti jānāmi iti passāmīti, tato aparena samay-
ena samanuggāhiyamāno vā asamanuggāhiyamāno vā āpanno visuddhāpekkho evaṃ 
vadeyya: ajānaṃ evaṃ āvuso avacaṃ jānāmi, apassaṃ passāmi, tucchaṃ musā vilapin 
ti, aññatra adhimānā, ayaṃ pi pārājiko hoti asaṃvaso. (Vin, III, 91)
12 This stereotyped account of the path of liberation has had different classifica-
tions over time. Yit (2004, 16 fn. 34) proposes that it is from D, I, 62 to D, I, 85 and al-
so provides references to the other scholarly classifications. An impressive account of 
the variations of this stereotyped path within nikāyas and āgamas will be provided by 
Gethin (forthcoming).
13 idam pi kho mahā-rāja sandiṭṭhikaṃ sāmañña-phalaṃ purimehi sandiṭṭhikehi 
sāmañña-phalehi abhikkantatarañ ca paṇītatarañ ca. (e.g. D, I, 77)
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goes beyond walls, ramparts, mountains unattached by them just 
as he was in the ether, he sinks and emerges from earth just as he 
were in the water, he walks on the water without sinking in it just 
as he were on the earth, he goes cross-legged through the ether 
just as he were a winged bird, he touches and strokes with the 
hand the sun and the moon which have so great power and splen-
dour, he goes even with the body as far as the Brahmā world.14
Successively, other abhiññās are listed, starting with the ‘element 
of the divine ear’ (dibbasotadhātu):15
He hears, with the element of the divine ear which is purified and far beyond the human 
one, both sounds, divine and human, distant and close.15
The ‘knowledge by comprehension of the minds [of others]’ 
(cetopariyañāṇa):
He knows with the mind the ways of thought of other beings, of other individuals:
when the mind is with passion he knows: ‘the mind is with passion’,
when the mind is without passion he knows: ‘the mind is without passion’,
when the mind is with hatred he knows: ‘the mind is with hatred’,
when the mind is without hatred he knows: ‘the mind is without hatred’,
when the mind is with delusion he knows: ‘the mind is with delusion’,
when the mind is without delusion he knows: ‘the mind is without delusion’,
when the mind is gathered he knows: ‘the mind is gathered’,
when the mind is scattered he knows: ‘the mind is scattered’,
when the mind is of great excellence he knows: ‘the mind is of great excellence’,
when the mind is not of great excellence he knows: ‘the mind is not of great excellence’,
when the mind is with a superior he knows: ‘the mind is with a superior’,
when the mind is without a superior he knows: ‘the mind is without a superior’,
when the mind is concentrated he knows: ‘the mind is concentrated’,
when the mind is not concentrated he knows: ‘the mind is not concentrated’,
when the mind is released he knows: ‘the mind is released’,
when the mind is unreleased he knows: ‘the mind is unreleased’.1616
14 so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudu-
bhūte kammaniye ṭhite ānejjappatte iddhi-vidhāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti. so 
aneka-vihitaṃ iddhi-vidhaṃ paccanubhoti – eko pi hutvā bahudhā hoti, bahudhā pi hutvā 
eko hoti, āvibhāvaṃ tiro-bhāvaṃ tiro-kuḍḍaṃ tiro-pākāraṃ tiro-pabbataṃ asajjamāno 
gacchati seyyathā pi ākāse, paṭhaviyā pi ummujja-nimmujjaṃ karoti seyyathā pi udake, 
udake pi abhijjamāno gacchati seyyathā pi paṭhaviyaṃ, ākāse pi pallaṅkena kamati 
seyyathā pi pakkhī sakuṇo, ime pi candima-suriye evaṃ mahiddhike evaṃ mahānubhāve 
pāṇinā parimasati parimajjati, yāva Brahma-lokā pi kāyena va saṃvatteti (D, I, 78). 
Anālayo (2016, 15 fn. 16) prefers the alternative reading vasaṃ vatteti in place of va 
saṃvatteti in the last phrase. However, this variation does not affect the present survey.
15 so dibbāya sotadhātuyā visuddhāya atikkanta-mānusikāya ubho sadde suṇāti, dib-
be ca mānuse ca, ye dūre santike ca (D, I, 79). Here and in the following abhiññās peri-
copes, the introductory phrase is omitted: so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte 
anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudu-bhūte kammaniye ṭhite ānejjappatte [specific power in-
flected in dative/genitive] cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti.
16 so para-sattānaṃ para-puggalānaṃ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti –
sa-rāgaṃ vā cittaṃ sa-rāgaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
vīta-rāgaṃ vā cittaṃ vīta-rāgaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
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The ‘knowledge of recollections of former existences’ 
(pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa):
He remembers the manifold past abodes in this way: one birth, 
two births, three births, four births, five births, ten births, twen-
ty births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, a hundred births, 
a thousand births, a hundred thousand births, many contracted 
aeons, many expanded aeons, many contracted and expanded ae-
ons. ‘I was over there, I had this name, this family, this caste, this 
food, I had experienced this happiness and this pain, I had this end 
of life. I disappeared from there and arose over there. Also there 
I was, I had this name, this family, this caste, this food, I had ex-
perienced this happiness and this pain, I had this end of life. I17 
disappeared from there and arose here’. Thus, he remembers the 
manifold past abodes in all their modes and in detail.18
The ‘knowledge of degeneration and ascent of beings’ (cutūpapātañāṇa):
He sees beings with the divine eye which is purified and far be-
yond the human one; he knows beings degenerating and ascend-
ing, reaching according to their kamma low [existences], excellent 
[existences], good conditions, bad conditions, good destinies, bad 
destinies. ‘Oh venerables, Alas! These beings are endowed with 
the bad conduct of the body, endowed with the bad conduct of the 
sa-dosaṃ vā cittaṃ sa-dosaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
vīta-dosaṃ vā cittaṃ vīta-dosaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
sa-mohaṃ vā cittaṃ sa-mohaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
vīta-mohaṃ vā cittaṃ vīta-mohaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
saṃkhittaṃ vā cittaṃ saṃkhittaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
vikkhittaṃ vā cittaṃ vikkhittaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
mahaggataṃ vā cittaṃ mahaggataṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
amahaggataṃ vā cittaṃ amahaggataṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
sa-uttaraṃ vā cittaṃ sa-uttaraṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
anuttaraṃ vā cittaṃ anuttaraṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
samāhitaṃ vā cittaṃ samāhitaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
asamāhitaṃ vā cittaṃ asamāhitaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
vimuttaṃ vā cittaṃ vimuttaṃ cittan ti pajānāti,
avimuttaṃ vā cittaṃ avimuttaṃ cittan ti pajānāti. (D, I, 79-80)
17 The Author followed the suggestion given by Giuliano Giustarini to read so ahaṃ 
in place of so.
18 so aneka-vihitaṃ pubbe-nivāsaṃ anussarati seyyathīdaṃ ekam pi jātiṃ dve pi jātiyo 
tisso pi jātiyo catasso pi jātiyo pañca pi jātiyo dasa pi jātiyo vīsatim pi jātiyo tiṃsam pi 
jātiyo cattārīsam pi jātiyo paññāsam pi jātiyo jāti-satam pi jāti-sahassam pi jāti-sata-
sahassam pi aneke pi saṃvaṭṭa-kappe aneke pi vivaṭṭa-kappe aneke pi saṃvaṭṭa-vivaṭṭa-
kappe. amutrāsiṃ evaṃ-nāmo evaṃ-gotto evaṃ-vaṇṇo evam-āhāro evaṃ-sukha-dukkha-
paṭisaṃvedī evam-āyu-pariyanto. tatrāpāsiṃ evaṃ-nāmo evaṃ-gotto evaṃ-vaṇṇo evam-
āhāro evaṃ-sukha-dukkha-paṭisaṃvedī evam-āyu-pariyanto. so tato cuto idhūpapanno ti 
iti sākāraṃ sa-uddesaṃ aneka-vihitaṃ pubbe nivāsaṃ anussarati. (D, I, 81)
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speech, endowed with the bad conduct of the mind, speaking evil 
of the nobles, having a wrong view, acquiring kamma through the 
wrong view. Cause the destruction of the body, they arose after 
death in an inferior destination, in a bad destiny, in a place of suf-
fering, in a hell. Oh venerables, but these beings are endowed with 
the good conduct of the body, endowed with the good conduct of the 
speech, endowed with the good conduct of the mind, not speaking 
evil of the nobles, having a right view, acquiring kamma through 
the right view. Cause the destruction of the body, they arose after 
death in a good destiny, in the heaven world’. Thus he sees, with 
the divine eye which is purified and far beyond the human one, 
the beings; he knows beings degenerating and ascending, reach-
ing according to their kamma low [existences], excellent [existenc-
es], good conditions, bad conditions, good destinies, bad destinies.19
The ‘knowledge of extinction’ (khayañāṇa) ‘of the noxious influxes’ 
(āsava):
He knows according to reality: ‘this is suffering’; he knows accord-
ing to reality: ‘this is the origin of suffering’; he knows according 
to reality: ‘this is the cessation of suffering’; he knows according 
to reality: ‘this is the path which leads to the cessation of suffer-
ing’; he knows according to reality: ‘these are the noxious influx-
es’; he knows according to reality: ‘this is the origin of the nox-
ious influxes’; he knows according to reality: ‘this is the cessation 
of the noxious influxes’; he knows according to reality: ‘this is the 
path which leads to the cessation of the noxious influxes’. When he 
knows and sees in this way, the mind is freed from the noxious in-
flux of the sensual desire, is freed from the noxious influx of the ex-
istence, is freed from the noxious influx of the ignorance, in the lib-
eration there is the knowledge ‘[the mind] is liberated’, he knows: 
‘the birth is exhausted, the holy life has been lived, what had to 
be done was done, from this life there will be not another one’.20
19 so dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkanta-mānusakena satte passati cavamāne 
upapajjamāne, hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathā-kammūpage 
satte pajānāti: ime vata bhonto sattā kāya-duccaritena samannāgatā vacī-duccaritena 
samannāgatā mano-duccaritena samannāgatā ariyānaṃ upavādakā micchā-diṭṭhikā 
micchā-diṭṭhi-kamma-samādānā. te kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ 
vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapannā. ime vā pana bhonto sattā kāya-sucaritena samannāgatā 
vacī-sucaritena samannāgatā mano-sucaritena samannāgatā ariyānaṃ anupavādakā 
sammā-diṭṭhikā sammā-diṭṭhi-kamma-samādānā, te kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ 
saggaṃ lokaṃ upapannā ti. iti dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkanta-mānusakena satte 
passati cavamāne upapajjamāne, hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate duggate yathā-
kammūpage satte pajānāti. (D, I, 82-3)
20 so idaṃ dukkhan ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkha-samudayo ti yathā-bhūtaṃ 
pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkha-nirodho ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ dukkha-nirodha-gāminī 
De Notariis
The Vedic Background of the Buddhist Notions of Iddhi and Abhiññā
Annali di Ca’ Foscari. Serie orientale e-ISSN 2385-3042
55, 2019, 227-264 ISSN 1125-3789
De Notariis
The Vedic Background of the Buddhist Notions of Iddhi and Abhiññā
235
4 Interpretation of the Terms iddhi and abhiññā
As in the case for other Buddhist terms, the translation of iddhi and 
abhiññā is in some ways problematic. Taking first the term iddhi, it 
is possible to state that it derives from a Sanskrit root √ṛdh, there-
fore, the Sanskrit equivalent of iddhi is ṛddhi.21 The term abhiññā 
derives from a Sanskrit abhi-√jñā and, therefore, its Sanskrit equiv-
alent is abhijñā. The term abhiññā could be literally translated as 
‘super-knowledge’ since the prefix abhi- often means an intensifica-
tion (cf. PED, 54) and the root √jñā means ‘to know’. However, this 
translation might sound a bit naive or unsophisticated, so the ren-
dering ‘higher knowledge’ will be adopted. It is worth noting that 
the term could have another less specific meaning related to the ac-
tion of knowing, namely ‘to know fully’. This meaning is connected 
with the use of the term within some texts, such as the Suttanipāta, 
which would show, according to some scholars, the older strata of 
the language.22 The root √ṛdh, from which the term iddhi derives, 
means to grow, increase, prosper, succeed (cf. SED, 226). Therefore, 
there is not a satisfying literal English translation – or at least it has 
not yet been found. Some scholars have adopted some literal transla-
tions, through terms like ‘success’, ‘accomplishment’ (e.g. Gombrich 
paṭipadā ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti, ime āsavā ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ āsava-
samudayo ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ āsava-nirodho ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti, ayaṃ 
āsava-nirodha-gāminī paṭipadā ti yathā-bhūtaṃ pajānāti. tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato 
kāmāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuccati bhavāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuccati avijjāsavā pi cittaṃ vimuc-
cati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti, khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ 
karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyā ti pajānāti. (D, I, 83-4)
21 It was highlighted by Fiordalis (2008, 157 fn. 18) and Overbey (2012, 129-31) as 
some scholars wrongly assumed an equivalence between iddhi and siddhi. On the ba-
sis of an etymological argument, indeed, the word siddhi derives from a different root, 
namely from √sidh. Therefore, in a Sanskrit version of a Pāli passage that explains the 
various kinds of iddhis (so aneka-vihitaṃ iddhi-vidhaṃ paccanubhoti; D, I, 78) the term 
iddhi is substituted by the term ṛddhi: so’nekavidham ṛddhiviṣayaṃ pratyanubhava-
ti (SbhV, II, 246).
22 References to this use of the term abhiññā in the Suttanipāta are provided by Gómez 
[2010] 2011, 515 fn. 5. Some scholars who suggested that the Suttanipāta was part of the 
older stratum of the Buddhist texts are, for instance, Nakamura ([1980] 1987, 44-6) and 
Hirakawa (1990, 77). Norman ([1992] 2001, XXXI-XXXIII) discussed the relative date 
of some parts of the Suttanipāta, suggesting an old composition of some of them, and 
also highlighted that some suttas might be mentioned also in Aśoka’s Calcutta-Bairāṭ 
edict ([1992] 2001, XXXIII-XXXIV). Some doubts about the supposed antiquity of the 
Suttanipāta have been put forward by De Jong (1991, 7; 1997, 97-8), whose observations, 
more recently, have been taken up by Cousins (2013, 18-9). The picture that emerges 
shows a difference of opinions though at least two chapters (vagga) of the Suttanipāta 
(viz. Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyanavagga) are still considered by some scholars one of the 
oldest records we have to the study of early Buddhism. In fact, Wynne and Gombrich 
recently wrote: “we believe that the Aṭṭhaka- and Pārāyana-vaggas (S[utta]n[ipāta] IV-
V) are the key to understanding early Buddhism” (2018, 88; square brackets are add-
ed; italics in the original).
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1997, 176; Gethin 2011, 221), however, these translations make com-
plete sense only if the reader has a basic knowledge of Buddhism. 
The phrase ‘A monk can achieve various successes after the crea-
tion of a body made of mind’ does not give a real insight into what 
the monk achieves, whereas the phrase ‘A monk can achieve various 
psychic powers after the creation of a body made of mind’ is certain-
ly more descriptive.23 These attempts of a literal translation try to in-
clude – even if only partially – at the same time all ranges of mean-
ing that the term iddhi covers. In fact, the term iddhi does not only 
mean the extraordinary capacities achieved by meditation, but it 
covers a wider range of applications.24 King Mahāsudassana, for in-
stance, was endowed with four iddhis: beauty, long life, good health, 
and he was beloved by Brahmins and householders (D, II, 177-8); The 
young Gotama, during his life as a prince, was endowed with a beau-
tiful garden with lotus ponds, pleasant garments, different houses for 
different seasons, and good food (A, I, 145). Iddhi is also the craft of a 
hunter (M, I, 151-2) and the ability of a hunted animal to escape (M, 
I, 155). The ability of geese to fly is also called iddhi (Dhp, 175). This 
term could also mean a sort of richness since its opposite (aniddhi) 
means ‘poor’, ‘poverty’ (DOP, 374).25 In spite of the large amount of 
meanings and applications, it can be argued that the use of the term 
iddhi within the account that lists the meditation attainments, name-
ly the fruits of meditation practice, is very peculiar, whereas in many 
cases quoted above, the term iddhi means something like accomplish-
ment, talent, or a particular beneficial condition. In some passages, 
it is particularly clear since the word samannāgata (D, I, 177-8; A, I, 
145) is used, which means ‘endowed with’ (with the term iddhi in the 
instrumental case),26 highlighting that iddhis, in that context, are 
something that one owns. When iddhis appear as meditation attain-
ments the emphasis is not on the possession, but it is on the experi-
ential factor. Iddhis are something that one can experience: paccan-
ubhoti (D, I, 78).27 So, the meaning, it seems, fluctuates between an 
23 However, it should be highlighted that the rendering ‘success’ works very well 
when the term iddhi occurs in combination with the verb ijjhati (which is from a root 
√ṛdh as well) since the latter could be translated as ‘to succeed’.
24 A list of cognate terms is provided by Vibh, 217.
25 Various applications of the term iddhi in different contexts are mentioned also in 
Rhys Davids 1899, 88 fn. 4; Fiordalis 2008, 123-4; French 1977, 43-4; Gethin 2011, 221. 
Cf. also the s.v. “iddhi” in PED, 107; DOP, 373-4; CPD, 291-2.
26 See s.v. “samannāgata” in PED, 616.
27 Here, it is worth reporting the remark the Author received from Giuliano Gius-
tarini. He rightly pointed out that the meditator is often endowed with (samannāgata) 
factors earlier developed. This is exemplified by passages such as: So iminā ca ariyena 
sīla-kkhandhena samannāgato iminā ca ariyena indriya-saṃvarena samannāgato iminā 
ca ariyena sati-sampajaññena samannāgato imāya ca ariyāya santuṭṭhiyā samannāgato 
(D, I, 71). Nevertheless, the Author was unable to find any persuasive canonical refer-
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‘endowment’ and an ‘experienceable achievement’. What all mean-
ings of the word iddhi have in common is that the term refers to some-
thing positive that is peculiar of someone, in the sense that is not 
ordinary, just as the iddhis of a king or a nobleman are not shared 
by the folk people, and in the same way the craft of the hunter, the 
agility of the hunted animal, and the ability to fly of geese are, all of 
them, not widespread skills. This also applies to the monk who has 
the possibility to experience iddhis, performances which can not be 
accomplished by an ordinary person without prior having engaged 
in a mental training or at least making use of a sort of esoteric sci-
ence.28 The performance is clearly made through the power of the 
mind, “when the mind is concentrated in this way […] he directs and 
turns the mind to the variety of iddhis” (so evaṃ samāhite citte […] 
iddhi-vidhāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti; D, I, 78), all these 
iddhis that the monk is able to perform are marvellous actions made 
through the mind. They are ‘psychic accomplishments’ or ‘psychic 
attainments’. The Author of the present article likes the translation 
‘psychic power’ for the term iddhi, despite the fact that this transla-
tion is open to criticism. In this regard, it was highlighted by Fior-
dalis that:
ence to the association of the term iddhi, indicating extraordinary performances, with 
samannāgata. The only canonical reference in which ‘samannāgata’ is associated with 
‘iddhi’ understood as ‘magical power’ is Kv, 456-8, which, however, does not fit exactly 
the context under analysis since it concerns the possibility to prolong one’s own lifes-
pan. Undoubtedly, the fact that iddhis could also be regarded as a kind of possession 
cannot be completely ruled out, the term iddhimant ‘one who has iddhi(s)’ is a good 
example. Furthermore, in Vibh (217), which provides some synonyms for iddhi, some 
terms indicate an acquisition, such as lābha or patti. However, in the same passage, 
there are also some terms that clearly indicate the connection of iddhi with the field 
of experience, such as phusanā and sacchikiriyā. The word phusanā is connected with 
the verb phusati ‘to touch’ (PED, 430), and the word sacchikiriyā with the verb sacchi-
karoti, which means ‘to experience’ in the sense of ‘to see with one’s eyes’ (PED, 603). 
Both terms suggest that this is a direct experience, just as the one acquired through 
the sense organs. Overall, it seems to me safe to maintain the experiential character-
istic as a prerogative of iddhi in this context.
28 This is attested, for instance, in the Kevaddhasutta (D, 11), in which the formulaic 
passage of D, I, 78 is used to explain what the term iddhi-pāṭihāriya means (cf. D, I, 212). 
In this text, the Buddha explains to Kevaddha that a person without faith would not be 
impressed by the miraculous performances and he would state: “There is a spell called 
‘Gandhārī’, through which this monk experiences variety of iddhis in many ways” (Atthi 
kho bho Gandhārī nāma vijjā. Tāya so bhikkhu aneka-vihitaṃ iddhi-vidhaṃ paccanubho-
ti; D, I, 213), a spell (vijjā) called Gandhārī occurs also in J, IV, 498-9. In the same way, 
a person without faith would not be impressed by the mind-reading (ādesanā) since he 
could affirm that “[t]here is an art that concerns talismans (Maṇika), through which a 
monk reads the mind and mental states of other beings and individuals” (Atthi kho bho 
Maṇiko nāma vijjā. Tāya so bhikkhu parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam pi ādisati ce-
tasikam pi ādisati; D, I, 214). Moreover, it is certainly interesting the term ‘Athabban-
iddhi’ in As, 92. Here, it is involved a magical power (iddhi) which derives from the im-
plementation of the teachings contained in the Atharvaveda (athabbana = Sanskrit: 
ātharvaṇa ‘belonging to the Atharvaveda’).
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psychic power does not give a sense for the diverse range of pow-
ers that fall under the category of ṛddhi, and elicits confusion with 
other superpowers, such as clairvoyance and telepathy. (2008, 123)
Fiordalis is basically stating that the term ‘psychic power’ could 
be also ascribed to some other abhiññās since the knowledge by 
comprehension of the minds [of others] (cetopariyañāṇa) is a kind of 
telepathy and the knowledge of degeneration and ascent of beings 
(cutūpapātañāṇa), in which the divine eye (dibbacakkhu) is devel-
oped, can be considered a sort of clairvoyance. He is certainly right 
in pointing this out, but nevertheless, the partial overlapping of the 
terms iddhi and abhiññā does not allow – at least according to the 
Author – a really safe translation for the term iddhi. Therefore, the 
translation of the term iddhi also made by Fiordalis, who often pre-
fers the rendition ‘superhuman power’,29 could overlap with the oth-
er abhiññās since clairvoyance and telepathy are certainly not an 
average human ability. Given that iddhi turned out to be an ambig-
uous term, not only for its broad semantic applications but also for 
its partial overlap with abhiññā, we should consider its translation 
as provisional and conventional. What seems to differentiate iddhis 
from the other abhiññās is that the iddhis result in a physical perfor-
mance, whereas the abhiññās result in a new knowledge (ñāṇa).30 In 
the exposition of the iddhis it is stated that the monk can multiply 
himself, can disappear or appear at will, and can achieve freedom of 
movement and mastery of natural elements. In the expositions of oth-
er abhiññās, on the other hand, a new knowledge of something is at-
tained: knowledge of sounds, knowledge of other minds, knowledge 
of recollections of former existences, knowledge of degeneration and 
ascent of beings according to their kamma, knowledge of extinction of 
the noxious influxes. The connection of the term iddhi with the term 
ñāṇa seems to be a later development, probably an outcome of the 
29 “Although I choose to translate ṛddhi as superhuman power, this is not a literal ren-
dering of the term” (Fiordalis 2008, 122), on another occasion commenting the Kevad-
dhasutta (D, 11), he wrote regarding the term iddhi: “[m]y preference for translating it 
as ‘superhuman power,’ at least in this context, derives partly from the fact that Bud-
dhist texts like this one sometimes gloss the term with uttarimanussa-dhamma, which 
can be translated more literally as a superhuman quality or characteristic” (Fiordalis 
[2010] 2011, 386 fn. 13).
30 It should be pointed out that commentarial literature tried to ascribe the term ñāṇa 
to the iddhi-vidha (cf. DA, I, 222-3), however, the term ñāṇa was already naturally con-
nected with four of the other abhiññās (e.g. cetopariya-ñāṇa, pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa, 
cutūpapāta-ñāṇa, āsavakhaya-ñāṇa) and in the other one, the element of the divine ear 
(dibbasotadhātu), it is easy to understand why it could be considered a ñāṇa, since it 
results in a kind of knowledge: the knowledge of sounds divine or human; far or near.
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Abhidhamma production.31 However, iddhis might be connected with 
knowledge even in the early texts. In some classifications, iddhis are 
one of the vijjās (e.g. D, I, 100) or one of the paññās (e.g. D, I, 124), 
and both vijjā and paññā are associated with the action of knowing. 
This may indicate that the experiential characteristic of iddhis can, 
somehow, lead to or be connected with knowledge.
5 The Vedic Background: Three Case Studies
Iddhis and abhiññās are not only terms that are difficult to trans-
late, but they are also concepts well integrated within the path of 
awakening and, therefore, their analysis could be of benefit for the 
general understanding of the Buddhist tradition. Among the Vedic 
texts,32 the closest ones to the Buddhist canon – not only in terms 
of chronology but also in terms of speculative arguments treat-
ed – are the Upaniṣads. However, not all scholars agree on the fact 
that Upaniṣads may have influenced early Buddhism. This controver-
sy has been recently summarised by Cohen ([2017] 2018), who, how-
ever, has dedicated an unequal number of pages to the two points 
of view and the theory that asserts the Upaniṣadic influence on ear-
ly Buddhism (Cohen [2017] 2018, 88-94) seems to prevail against the 
theory that assumes no direct relationship between the Upaniṣads 
and early Buddhism (88).33 Notwithstanding the academic controver-
sies, a comparison between the Buddhist canon and the Upaniṣads 
is certainly of great benefit as to whether (1) the shared ideas be-
tween Buddhism and Upaniṣads are due to the common cultural mi-
lieu, or (2) that either Upaniṣadic ideas influenced Buddhism or Bud-
dhist texts sometimes refer to or criticise Upaniṣadic concepts. In 
both cases, it seems safe to assume that a study concerning Vedic 
texts (especially the oldest Upaniṣads) could facilitate and support 
the reconstruction of the historical context in which Buddhism was 
born and developed.
31 The oldest references to the compound iddhividha-ñāṇa occur mainly in Abhidham-
mic works, such as the Paṭṭhāna (e.g. Tikap, II, 166) or in the semi-Abhidhammic work 
known as Paṭisambhidāmagga (e.g. Paṭi, I, 111).
32 The Author is aware of the complexity in defining what ‘Veda’ is. Therefore, the 
Author shall specify that he employs, in this work, the term ‘Vedic’ and other derivates 
in a wide sense, including Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. What kinds of texts were consid-
ered part of the Veda depends by the historical period. Hence, in some old texts, such 
as the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, there is a mention about the three Vedas (trayeṇa vede-
na; ŚB 5.5.5.10) indicating that only the mantras were considered ‘Vedas’ at that time.
33 The extensive work of Bronkhorst (2007) has been dismissed in a handful of lines.
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5.1 A Glance into the Vedic Background in Order  
to Solve a Problem
Among these Buddhist extraordinary capacities, the iddhis are par-
ticularly interesting. As it was previously noted, the iddhis are mar-
vellous performances made possible through the power of a mind 
trained in meditation. Since in the Sāmaññaphalasutta the perfor-
mance of iddhis is preceded by the creation of the body made of mind 
(manomaya-kāya),34 some scholars argue that the performance of ex-
traordinary capacities is realised through this mental body.35 Howev-
er, the Sāmaññaphalasutta does not specifically state it, and this as-
sumption seems to be based on the fact that the body made of mind 
is created before attainment of the ability to perform iddhis.36 This 
argument, however, could be subject to the logical fallacy named 
post hoc ergo propter hoc, namely the assumption that what happens 
before is the cause of what follows. As a matter of fact, the tempo-
ral connection does not necessarily imply a causal one. However, it 
should be noted that on the one hand, many steps of the path of lib-
eration in the Sāmaññaphalasutta seem to be connected to each oth-
er, such as the elimination of the five hindrances (pañca-nīvaraṇa), 
which seems to lead to the attainment of the first level of meditative 
absorption (paṭhamajjhāna) (cf. D, I, 73). Yet, on the other hand some 
steps are not directly influenced by each other, such as the knowl-
edge by comprehension of the minds [of others] (cetopariyañāṇa) that 
is not attained thanks to the previous one, the element of the divine 
ear (dibbasotadhātu). Obviously, the iddhis and the other abhiññās 
could be considered in a very scholastic and synchronic way as only 
one step, the chaḷabhiññā, but this interpretation would not take into 
account the fact that this classification might have not yet been devel-
oped when this passage was composed, since the word ‘abhiññā’ does 
not even appear within this sutta with this kind of meaning.37 More-
34 The exposition of the creation of the body made of mind in the Sāmaññaphalasutta 
has been recently discussed by De Notariis (2018).
35 This opinion is supported by Swearer 1973, 449; Harvey 1993, 36; Hamilton 1996, 
162-3; Radich 2007, 257; Clough [2010] 2011, 417; Lee 2014, 67; Anālayo 2016, 16.
36 This is the argumentation, for instance, of Radich (2007, 257) and Anālayo (2016, 16).
37 Therefore, all these attainments are listed in a section that could be a “coherent 
and separate work, which occurs in many other sutras both in the Pali and non-Pa-
li traditions” (MacQueen 1988, 179). The term abhiññā occurs in the phrasing sayaṃ 
abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti (D, I, 62), but here it is just a short form of the absolutive 
abhiññāya (from the verb abhijānāti). Finally, it should be specified that the Author does 
not rule out the possibility that the stages – or at least some of them – in the path of lib-
eration are connected to each other, but he believes that other possibilities should be 
taken into account as well. In fact, even other stages such as the practice of the monk 
to be mindful and fully aware in all his activities (sati-sampajañña; D, I, 70-1) and the 
fact that the monk becomes content of his frugal life (santuṭṭha; D, I, 71) are not strong-
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over, there is a paradox, namely that later texts regard the creation 
of the mind-made body as an iddhi (cf. Paṭi, II, 205 and Vism, 378), 
and not a requisite to perform iddhis. In conclusion, there is likely 
a reasonable doubt about the fact that the extraordinary capacities 
are performed through the body made of mind since it is not clearly 
stated what its function is.38
A solution to this problem may require to pay further attention 
to the Vedic texts, whose descriptions of extraordinary capacities 
are likely earlier than Buddhist ones. A very interesting example is 
found in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad in a passage that deals with a self 
(ātman) which is “the person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya) 
among the breaths, the brightness inside the heart” (vijñānamayaḥ 
prāṇeṣu hṛdy antarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ; BU 4.3.7). This self is able to 
move in the intermediate world, which is an oneiric state that con-
nects this world with the other world: “he, being common to both 
worlds, moves across them, just so he contemplates them, just so 
he oscillates [among] them. Thus, having fallen asleep, he goes be-
yond this world, these forms of death” (sa samānaḥ sann ubhau lokāv 
anusaṃcarati dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva | sa hi svapno bhūtvemaṃ lokam 
atikrāmati mṛtyo rūpāṇi; BU 4.3.7). The oneiric state is the interme-
diate state between this world and the other: “for this or that per-
son there are indeed two states: this [world] and the state of the oth-
er world. The state of dream is the third and it is the junction point. 
Staying in this rendezvous point, he looks at both states: this [world] 
and the state of the other world” (tasya vā etasya puruṣasya dve 
ly linked to each other. Another instance is when the monk finds a secluded dwelling 
(vivittaṃ senāsana bhajati; D, I, 71), he does this endowed with (samannāgata) many 
factors earlier developed, not just the previous one. These examples highlight that it is 
too simplistic to assume that a stage is developed only on the basis of the previous one.
38 This is also evident from the way in which scholars have asserted that the iddhis are 
performed by means of the body made of mind. By way of example three recent works 
will be considered. Hamilton wrote that: “though it is not explicitly stated in the text, it 
would appear that it is the mind-made body which is subsequently directed by the mind 
to perform the iddhis, use its divine hearing and seeing, have insight into the minds of 
others, and recall former existences, and ultimately eradicate the āsavas” (1996, 162-
3). The fact that the statement is not certain is due to the modal verb ‘would’, which im-
plies that Hamilton considered it as a possibility and not a certainty. Radich wrote that 
“[n]ow, I suggest that, though the text never explicitly says so, there is a clear implica-
tion here that the sequence we have just rehearsed is a sequence of necessary prereq-
uisites for the elaboration of each successive step on the path […] it is only on the basis 
of this thorough and clear-sighted disillusionment with the fleshly body that it is pos-
sible to elaborate the manomayakāya; it is only on the basis of the elaboration of the 
manomayakāya that it is possible to attain the superpowers” (2007, 257). As previous-
ly stated, this argument could be affected by the logical fallacy named post hoc ergo 
propter hoc. Lee wrote, concerning the body made of mind, that “[t]his special body 
has the ability to perform many supranormal activities” (2014, 67), without providing 
any reference or justification for this statement. In brief, it seems that there was a de-
ficiency in past academic research on this topic.
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eva sthāne bhavata idaṃ ca paralokasthānaṃ ca | sandhyaṃ tṛtīyaṃ 
svapnasthānam | tasmin sandhye sthāne tiṣṭhann ete ubhe sthāne 
paśyatīdaṃ ca paralokasthānaṃ ca; BU 4.3.9). In this dreamlike state, 
this person made of consciousness displays the creative power of 
the mind39 and so is able to manipulate matter to create objects and 
parts of the landscape:
When he falls asleep, having taken away the matter of this entire 
world, having taken apart from his own, having created by his own, 
he dreams with his own splendor, with his own light. Then this person 
becomes his own light. In that place there are no chariots, there are 
not what is yoked on chariots (i.e. horses), there are no roads. Then 
he emits chariots, what is yoked on chariots, and roads. In that place 
there is no happiness, delight, gladness. Then he emits happiness, 
delight, gladness. In that place there are no ponds, tanks, and riv-
ers. Then he emits ponds, tanks, and rivers. Hence, he is the creator.40
This passage is also quoted by Sue Hamilton, who seems to suggest 
that, all in all, vijñānamaya and manomaya could be synonyms to in-
dicate the subtle body (liṅgaśarīra) in the early Upaniṣads.41 How-
ever, it seems that she has underestimated the Taittirīyopaniṣad ac-
count in which the vijñānamaya self is a level more rarefied than the 
manomaya self. In fact, in this text it appears in a list which devel-
ops from the grossest element to the most rarefied (e.g. TU 3.10.4-5). 
The list exhibits five kinds of self and each of them is made (-maya) 
of a different substance: food (anna), breath (prāṇa), mind (manas), 
consciousness (vijñāna), and bliss (ānanda). Hamilton (1996, 146) pro-
poses the existence of a theory in the Upaniṣads according to which 
the reality and human existence is divided into three modes of ex-
istence and she relies upon the Taittirīyopaniṣad only to reinforce 
her argument, since the central part of the list of the five kinds of 
self (prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya) resembles a list found in 
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4.4.5 (vijñānamaya, manomaya, prāṇamaya).
39 As it was pointed out by Hamilton (1996, 147).
40 sa yatra prasvapity asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrām apādāya svayaṃ vihatya 
svayaṃ nirmāya svena bhāsā svena jyotiṣā prasvapiti | atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃjyotir 
bhavati || na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanti | atha rathān rathayogān 
pathaḥ sṛjate | na tatrānandā mudaḥ pramudo bhavanti | athānandān mudaḥ pramudaḥ 
sṛjate | na tatra veśāntāḥ puṣkariṇyaḥ sravantyo bhavanti | atha veśāntān puṣkariṇīḥ 
sravantīḥ sṛjate | sa hi kartā. (BU 4.3.9-10)
41 After arguing that in the Upaniṣads there is a subdivision of reality according to 
three modes of existences (quoting CU 6.5.1-4, cf. Hamilton 1996, 146), she writes, with 
reference to the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad’s passage: “[i]n this context, the term manomaya 
is not used to describe the intermediate level of sleep/dream, but three levels are never-
theless indicated. […] In the early Upaniṣads, it is the terms manomaya and vijñānamaya 
(and possibly dreams) which suggest the subtle self” (Hamilton 1996, 147).
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Moreover, it may seem that in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad’s pas-
sage – in which the person made of consciousness is able to move 
in an intermediate oneiric world between this world and the oth-
er – vijñānamaya has a very peculiar application. It can be argued that 
in this passage the word vijñāna was not used in order to indicate the 
mind by chance. In this regard, within another Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 
passage concerning a dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Gārgya, the 
one who is able to move in the oneiric state is, indeed, a person 
(puruṣa) made of consciousness (vijñānamaya):
Ajātaśatru told him: “When he has fallen asleep, this person made 
of consciousness (vijñānamaya), having taken consciousness by 
means of consciousness of these vital functions (prāṇa), settles 
down in the empty space inside the heart. When he takes these 
[functions], then this person is called ‘sleeping’. The vital breath is 
seized, seized is the speech, seized is the sight, seized is the hear-
ing, seized is the mind (manas). Wherever he roams into the dream, 
these worlds become his own, he becomes also a great king or a 
great brahmin, he settles in high and low [worlds]. Just as a great 
king, having seized the population ( jānapada), would roam wher-
ever he wants in his own country ( janapada), exactly in the same 
way he, having seized the vital functions (prāṇa), roams by himself 
wherever he wants in his own body”.42
Also, in this latter passage, which again concerns the oneiric world, 
a person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya) is involved. One might 
be tempted to speculate about an equivalence between the terms 
used to indicate the ‘mind’: citta, manas, and vijñāna. Buddhist texts, 
indeed, often lack a clear distinction between these terms. In the 
Saṃyuttanikāya there is even a passage which states directly the 
equivalence of these terms: cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññānaṃ iti pi (S, 
II, 94; quoted also in Mrs. Rhys Davids 1914, 17). Moreover, Buddhag-
hosa in a specific context also accords the same meaning to these 
expressions used to designate the mind: viññāṇaṃ, cittaṃ, mano ti 
atthato ekaṃ (Vism, 452). However, although these terms are some-
times synonyms, it seems that frequently in Buddhist texts they al-
so have specific applications. In the partial investigation made by 
42 sa hovācājātaśatruḥ | yatraiṣa etat supto ’bhūd ya eṣa vijñānamayaḥ puruṣas tad 
eṣāṃ prāṇānāṃ vijñānena vijñānam ādāya ya eṣo ’ntar hṛdaya ākāśas tasmiñ chete | tāni 
yadā gṛhṇāty atha haitat puruṣaḥ svapiti nāma | tad gṛhīta eva prāṇo bhavati | gṛhītā 
vāk | gṛhītaṃ cakṣuḥ | gṛhītaṃ śrotram | gṛhītaṃ manaḥ || sa yatraitat svapnyayā cara-
ti te hāsya lokāḥ | tad uteva mahārājo bhavaty uteva mahābrāhmaṇaḥ | utevoccāvacaṃ 
nigacchati | sa yathā mahārājo jānapadān gṛhītvā sve janapade yathākāmaṃ parivarte-
taivam evaiṣa etat prāṇān gṛhītvā sve śarīre yathākāmaṃ parivartate. (BU 2.1.17-8)
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Johansson43 it is shown how citta, manas, and viññāṇa have some at-
tributes in common, but also differ in some aspects (Johansson 1965, 
209).44 Therefore, for instance in the Pāli canon only the term ma-
nas is used to indicate that a body (kāya) is made of mind: manoma-
ya. Alternative options such as *cittamaya and *viññāṇamaya are not 
attested within both canon and commentaries.45 This could also be 
the case in the Upaniṣadic passages examined above, wherein the 
mention of a person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya) might re-
veal a specific way to indicate the personification or embodiment that 
acts in the oneiric state. It is worth noting that this person seizes 
the vital functions and among them there is also the mind (manas): 
tad gṛhīta eva prāṇo bhavati | gṛhītā vāk | gṛhītaṃ cakṣuḥ | gṛhītaṃ 
śrotram | gṛhītaṃ manaḥ (BU 2.1.17). Therefore, vijñāna and manas 
should not be regarded as synonyms in this context since they car-
ry out different functions.
So, if vijñānamaya and manomaya are not perfect synonyms, it 
would seem that to demonstrate that the extraordinary performanc-
es were really made through the body made of mind we should find 
a direct reference to it. In this regard, it might be useful to quote a 
passage from the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, a text probably older than the 
Upaniṣads. The text states:
He should meditate on the self which is made of mind (manomaya), 
whose body is vital breath, with a luminous appearance (bhārūpa), 
with an ethereal essence, which has the form it desires, which is 
swift as the thought, which has the desire of the truth, which sup-
ports the truth, which consists of all odours, which consists of all 
tastes, which extends and pervades throughout the whole regions, 
which is speechless, which is disinterested.46
43 ‘Partial’ was chosen, since Johansson stated that: “[a]s this is not a statistical in-
vestigation, no completeness was aimed at, but an attempt was made to include as many 
different contexts as possible: I aimed at semantic completeness” (1965, 166).
44 It seems that although these terms correspond to different mental functions, they 
are also strongly connected to each other. Therefore, Swearer writes: “in the Pāli sut-
tas the terms citta, mano, and viññāṇa were used either synonymously or as essential-
ly related aspects of the same empirical consciousness” (1972, 358). Years later a sim-
ilar statement was written by Somaratne: “[i]n sum, citta, manas and viññāṇa, though 
notionally, can separately be identified on the basis of their specific mental functions, 
though the three are aspects of the same mind” (2005, 201).
45 It is remarkable that the term viññāṇamaya is found in late sub-commentarial lit-
erature, such as in the purāṇaṭīkā of the Dīghanikāya, in which, however, it appears in a 
passage that is an Upaniṣadic quotation: ‘Annamayo pāṇamayo manomaya ānandamayo 
viññāṇamayo’ ti pañcadhā attānaṃ Vedavādino vadanti (DA-ṭ, 202). The sub-commentary 
refers here to the doctrine of the five kinds of self presented in the Taittirīyopaniṣad, 
oddly inverting ānandamayo and viññāṇamayo.
46 sa ātmānam upāsīta manomayaṃ prāṇaśarīraṃ bhārūpam ākāśātmānaṃ 
kāmarūpiṇaṃ manojavasaṃ satyasaṃkalpaṃ satyadhṛtiṃ sarvagandhaṃ sarvarasaṃ 
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This self made of mind demonstrates to have a mastership on the 
physical matter, since it ‘has the form it desires’ (kāmarūpin), it is en-
dowed with a super-velocity since it ‘is swift as the thought’ (mano-
javas), and also ‘extends and pervades throughout the whole region’ 
(sarvā anu diśaḥ prabhūtaṃ sarvam idam abhyāptam); basically, it is 
free to move wherever it wants, such as the monk who performs id-
dhis ‘goes beyond walls, ramparts, mountains unattached by them 
just as he was in the ether’ (tiro-kuḍḍaṃ tiro-pākāraṃ tiro-pabbataṃ 
asajjamāno gacchati; D, I, 78).
This Śatapathabrāhmaṇa’s passage shows a self made of mind 
(manomaya) that is endowed with extraordinary capacities, just like 
the person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya) in the oneiric state 
within the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad’s passage. So, it would seem that 
manomaya and vijñānamaya could actually represent similar func-
tions, although the Taittirīyopaniṣad’s account and the peculiar pres-
ence of the person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya) in the ac-
counts concerning the oneiric state do not allow them to be regarded 
as perfect synonyms. It could be stated that at least part of the Ve-
dic tradition would justify a connection between a self made of mind 
and the acquisition of capacities that are extraordinary. Therefore, 
the linguistic similarity of the term manomaya among distinct tradi-
tions reveals some shared features, though the contexts in which it 
occurs should always be carefully analysed in order to avoid a level-
ling of its function and use within different Indian traditions and dif-
ferent contexts within the same tradition.47
5.2 The Term ‘Divine’ (Pāli: dibba; Sanskrit: divya/daiva):  
What is There Behind the Linguistic Similarity?
On the basis of the formulation of some of the Buddhist abhiññās, 
it is possible to detect both change and continuity with the Vedic 
thought. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the ‘element of 
the divine ear’ (dibba-sota-dhātu) and the development of the ‘divine 
eye’ (dibba-cakkhu) within the abhiññā called the ‘knowledge of de-
generation and ascent of beings’ (cutūpapātañāṇa). The point of in-
terest is the Pāli adjective dibba48 (Sanskrit: divya or daiva), which 
sarvā anu diśaḥ prabhūtaṃ sarvam idam abhyāptam avākkam anādaraṃ. (ŚB 10.6.3.2)
47 A detailed analysis concerning some shared features of manomaya in Buddhism 
and Upaniṣads will be provided by De Notariis (forthcoming).
48 Within the late Pāli commentarial literature, when the term is associated with 
the mind-made body of some gods, it is explained that “[the term] ‘dibba’ [refers to 
something] produced in the divine world” (dibbo ti devaloke sambhūto; DA, I, 120 
= Vibh-a, 509). A similar kind of explanation also occurs regarding the divine ear 
and the divine eye. Taking the divine ear as an example, it is stated that: “in this 
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means ‘divine’ and allows one to discover a certain connection with 
the Upaniṣads and Vedic texts. In the Buddhist passage the divine 
eye was developed through the action of the mind, and it is also pos-
sible in a passage of the Chāndogyopaniṣad (8.12.5) to detect a con-
nection between the divine eye and the mind:
Then, one who understands: ‘considering this’, which is the self; 
the mind is his divine (daiva) eye. This, indeed, enjoys – seeing 
with the mind, with the divine eye – these desires (kāma), which 
are in the world of brahman.49
In other Upaniṣadic passages it is possible to find that the adjective 
‘divine’, connected with some faculties, produces marvellous results, 
such as in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (1.5.18-20):
From fire and earth, divine (daivī) speech enters him. This very di-
vine speech by which whatever one says, it happens.
From sky and sun, divine mind enters him. This very divine mind 
by which one becomes one who has happiness and therefore does 
not suffer.
From waters and moon, divine breath enters him. This very divine 
breath, which moving or resting does not waver nor receives harm.50
It is also attested that a natural manifestation, namely the thunder, 
could be considered a divine voice, most likely the voice of the sky 
(div/dyu) which is divine (daivī):
context, ‘with the element of the divine ear’, the term divine here [is used because] 
has similarity to the divine. The gods have only the element of ear purified and di-
vine which is able to catch a [sound] object even if far since it is free from impu-
rities, is unobstructed by bile, phlegm, blood, etc.; it is created thanks to their re-
sult of good conduct. And this element of ear devoted to knowing of this monk, which 
was developed by the power of mental culture and energy, is, indeed, of such quali-
ty, which is divine because it has similarity to the divine one. Moreover, it is divine 
even because it is attained through divine dwellings and because itself relies on di-
vine dwellings” (Tatra dibbāya sotadhātuyā ti ettha dibbasadisattā dibbā. Devānaṃ hi 
sucaritakammanibbattā pittasemharuhirādīhi apaḷibuddhā upakkilesavimuttatāya dūre 
pi ārammaṇaṃ sampaṭicchanasamatthā dibbappasādasotadhātu hoti. Ayañ cā pi imassa 
bhikkhuno viriyabhāvanābalanibbattā ñāṇasotadhātu tādisā yevā ti dibbasadisattā dibbā. 
Api ca dibbavihāravasena paṭiladdhattā attanā ca dibbavihārasannissitattā pi dibbā; 
Vism, 407 = Ud-a, 201; Paṭi-a, I, 353). A similar explanation concerning the divine eye 
occurs in Vism, 423; Ud-a, 73; It-a, II, 27; MNidd-a, II, 376; Vin-a, I, 162-3; Paṭi-a, I, 53.
49 atha yo vededaṃ manvānīti sa ātmā | mano ’sya daivaṃ cakṣuḥ | sa vā eṣa etena 
daivena cakṣuṣā manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramate ya ete brahmaloke. (CU 8.12.5)
50 pṛthivyai cainam agneś ca daivī vāg āviśati | sā vai daivī vāg yayā yad yad eva vada-
ti tat tad bhavati || divaś cainam ādityāc ca daivaṃ mana āviśati | tad vai daivaṃ mano 
yenānandy eva bhavaty atho na śocati || adbhyaś cainaṃ candramasaś ca daivaḥ prāṇa 
āviśati | sa vai daivaḥ prāṇo yaḥ saṃcaraṃś cāsaṃcaraṃś ca na vyathate ’tho na riṣyati. 
(BU 1.5.18-20)
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Just this, the divine voice, the Thunder, repeats: ‘Da! Da! Da!’. Be 
tamed (dāmyata)! Donate (datta)! Be compassionate (dayadhvam)! 
One should yearn for the same triad: self-control (dama), donation 
(dāna), compassion (dayā).51
These examples make clear that although the higher knowledges 
(abhiññā) are extraordinary capacities more properly Buddhist, their 
exposition is, in some ways, still in connection with the late Vedic 
thought. Furthermore, it would be possible to state that the senso-
rial faculties were connected with the terms ‘deva’ and ‘devatā’ be-
cause of the Vedic tendency to establish analogies and connections 
between different realms of existence. From the time of the Ṛgveda, 
as attested for instance by the very famous Puruṣasūkta (ṚV 10.90), 
the Indian tradition established correspondences between human 
body and cosmos, which are respectively the microcosm and the 
macrocosm. Regarding these kinds of correspondences already pre-
sent in the Ṛgveda (although not systematically worked out as in later 
texts), the mundane or microcosmic level is called adhyātma, where-
as the cosmic one is adhidevata or adhidaiva and the level of sacrifice 
is adhiyajña (cf. Jamison, Brereton 2014, 23-4). Such correspondenc-
es were often called bandhu ‘bond’, and they were also of great im-
portance for later Vedic texts, such as Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads.52 
It is possible to find a good example of how these correspondences 
work at the very beginning of the Aitareyopaniṣad. The account starts 
with the creation of the worlds by the self (ātman), who was alone in 
the beginning. Thereafter, he created a man (puruṣa)53 and this cre-
ation is reported as the creation of the bodily parts, to which func-
tions and cosmic divinities correspond. The creation of the bodily 
parts begins after he had extracted the man from the waters,54 made 
him solid (amūrchayat) and instilled heat into him (abhyatapat).55 The 
51 tad etad evaiṣā daivī vāg anuvadati stanayitnur da da da iti | dāmyata datta dayad-
hvam iti | tad etat trayaṃ śikṣed damam dānam dayām iti (BU 5.2.3). The Author sus-
pects that this Upaniṣadic passage is echoed in the Dīghanikāya: Tiṇṇaṃ kho me idaṃ 
kammānaṃ phalaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ kammānaṃ vipāko, yenāhaṃ etarahi evaṃ mahiddhiko evaṃ 
mahānubhāvo, seyyathīdaṃ dānassa damassa saṃyamassa. (D, II, 186)
52 Cf. Gonda 1965; Olivelle 1998, 24; Smith 1998, 78-81; for a list of other terms used 
to indicate connections, see Smith 1998, 78 fn. 134.
53 With the word ‘man’, the male of human species to which the word puruṣa refers 
to in Vedic contexts is meant (for more information, see Killingley 2006, 80). In this 
context, this translation is incontrovertible since among the created bodily parts there 
will be also the penis (śiśna).
54 Since udbhya ‘from out of these’ is an ablative plural, Connoly wrote that “the 
puruṣa was derived from all the worlds created by the self and not just from the waters” 
(1997, 32). However, it should be highlighted that also ‘waters’ is plural, so it seems that 
the text allows more than one interpretation.
55 so ’dbhya eva puruṣaṃ samuddhṛtyāmūrcchayat || tam abhyatapat. (AU 1.1.3-4)
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first part of the body to be listed was the mouth, from which speech 
and fire came out: “the mouth (mukha) hatched like an egg, from the 
mouth [came out] the speech (vāc), from the speech [came out] the 
fire (agni)” (mukhaṃ nirabhidyata yathāṇḍam mukhād vāg vāco ’gniḥ; 
AU 1.1.4). So, a bodily part (mukha, ‘the mouth’) is associated with a 
function (vāc, ‘speech’), and with a divinity (agni, ‘fire’). This schema 
is repeated for other parts of the body, functions, and deities, result-






















































* For the translation of the term apāna in this context, see Brown 1919, 109; Connolly 
1997, 32; Pelissero 1998, 107. Anyway, it should be specified that the translation of 
apāna is a contentious issue.
Fire, wind, sun, directions, plants and trees, moon, death, and waters 
are named ‘deities’ in the Aitareyopaniṣad, i.e. devatā.56 These dei-
ties, once they were created, after having sprung from the primor-
dial puruṣa, plummeted into a great chaotic mass of water (arṇava) 
and so they requested: “identify us a dwelling in which once estab-
lished we can eat food”.57 A cow and a horse were offered to these 
deities, but they were deemed inadequate abodes. Thereafter, a man 
(puruṣa) was offered, which meets the expectations and any deity, af-
ter having become the respective faculty, enters in its physical locus 
within the body. For instance, “the fire, after having become speech, 
enters the mouth”.58
56 tā etā devatāḥ sṛṣṭā. (AU 1.2.1)
57 āyatanaṃ naḥ prajānīhi | yasmin pratiṣṭhitā annam adāma. (AU 1.2.1)
58 agnir vāg bhūtvā mukhaṃ prāviśat (AU 1.2.4). Connolly (1997, 32) seems to consid-
er as devatā also the functions such as speech (vāc), breath (prāṇa), etc. However, the 
subject that enters into the dwelling is devatā, understood as the deity transformed into 
the faculty. In this regard, it is written that “[the ātman] said to them [tā(ḥ) = devatā]: 
‘enter in your respective dwelling!’” (tā abravīd yathāyatanaṃ praviśateti; AU 1.2.3) 
and so the one which enters (pra-√viś) is the deity (e.g. fire, i.e. the devatā), after hav-
ing become the faculty (e.g. speech).
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Accounts, just like the one described in the above exposition of 
Aitareyopaniṣad (1.1-2) that has just been exposed, show that there is 
something divine behind the activity of the physical organs accord-
ing to the Vedic thought. A divine and cosmic power underlies the 
normal functioning of the human body and a series of correspond-
ences aim to identify at which part of the human body a certain di-
vinity is allocated and which function it performs.59 It is worth not-
ing the strongly established idea that, among the faculties, the mind 
(manas) is regarded as divine. Therefore, besides the aforementioned 
passage in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (1.5.19), in which a mind that 
is divine appears (e.g. daivaṃ mano), as early as the Ṛgveda it occurs 
a mind which is divine: kavīyamānaḥ ka iha pra vocad devam manaḥ 
kuto adhi prajātam (ṚV 1.164.18).60 The mind is even called in the late 
Praśnopaniṣad the supreme deity and is the place in which the other 
faculties are grouped together during the sleep.61 It is this deity (de-
va) who experiences dreams.
In Buddhism, the sensorial faculties are connected with a divine-
sphere (dibba) only when the aim is to indicate that they are able to 
operate beyond the normal physical boundaries. A connection with 
a power able to affect and interact with the universe is maintained 
by the mind and, therefore, extraordinary capacities such as iddhis 
and abhiññās are developed only after a mental purification.62 In 
this regard, it could be useful to highlight that the canonical Bud-
dhist texts might represent an initial stage in the process of depar-
ture from the Vedic understanding of the sensorial faculties. Unfor-
tunately, a comprehensive treatment of the sensorial faculties within 
Buddhist texts would exceed the limits of the present survey. How-
ever, it would be worth noting how the late Theravāda exegesis de-
veloped a mechanical explanation of the sensorial faculty process (in 
this case the process of seeing), which does not leave any room for 
the idea that the sensorial process is still in connection with cosmic 
powers or divinities:
59 There are, in the Upaniṣads, many other lists of faculties with respective deities 
that differ from the list in the Aitareyopaniṣad taken into account in terms of faculties, 
functions, deities and the correspondence between these. However, the underlying 
thought is the same. More Upaniṣadic lists, with a particular reference to pentads and 
their relationship with Sāṃkhya, have been analysed by Killingley (2016).
60 This kind of reference appears also within other Vedic texts, such as Atharvaveda 
and Vājasaneyisaṃhitā (i.e. AV 1.1.2 and VS 34.1), cf. Wijesekera ([1944] 1994, 155-6).
61 evaṃ ha vai tat sarvaṃ pare deve manasy ekībhavati (PU 4.2).
62 See for instance: “when the mind is concentrated in this way, purified, cleaned, 
unblemished, freed from impurities, malleable, fit for work, steadfast, having attained 
impassibility, he directs and turns the mind to the variety of iddhis” (so evaṃ samāhite 
citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudu-bhūte kammaniye ṭhite 
ānejjappatte iddhi-vidhāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti. so aneka-vihitaṃ iddhi-
vidhaṃ paccanubhoti; D, I, 78).
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When the thought ‘I will look ahead!’ is generated, together with 
this very thought the wind element (vāyo-dhātu) caused by the 
thought, which brings forth the information (viññatti),63 is pro-
duced. Thus, through the diffusion of the wind element due to the 
action of the thought, the lowest eyelid sinks down and the upper-
most eyelid jumps up; there is not anyone who opens it through 
a mechanism. Then the sight-consciousness, which performs the 
function of seeing, is produced.64
It is as if the mental thought generates the electric impulsion (vāyo-
dhātu),65 which causes the eye to open through the eyelid shift and, 
after that, the sight consciousness arises and allows the individu-
al to see.
So, it was noted that in Buddhism some faculties (seeing, hearing) 
may become divine if the mind is properly trained. This would seem a 
residue of the Vedic conception of the human being in its relation with 
the cosmos. However, although the old correlation between physical 
body parts, functions and deities is well attested in the Upaniṣads, 
an emerging tendency towards the new development occuring in Bud-
dhism could be traced back to the Upaniṣadic texts, in which the ad-
jective ‘divine’ is attributed to some faculties when they perform a 
particular function beyond the normal human reach or even non-hu-
man (e.g. BU 1.5.18: ‘divine speech is that which makes whatever one 
says happen’, or when the voice of a thunder is called divine, i.e. BU 
5.2.3). So, this would lead us to expect that it would be possible to 
recover other faded images in the Upaniṣads of what would be fur-
ther developed in later time by Buddhist tradition.
63 On the Abhidhammic concept of ‘viññatti’, see Harvey (1993, 34-5) and Karunada-
sa (2010, 189-98), who translate it as ‘intimation’.
64 ‘Ālokessāmīti’ pana citte uppajjamāne ten’ eva cittena saddhiṃ citta-samuṭṭhānā 
vāyo-dhātu viññattiṃ janayamānā uppajjati. Iti citta-kiriya-vāyo-dhātu-vipphāravasen’ 
eva hetthimaṃ akkhi-dalaṃ adho sīdati, uparimaṃ uddhaṃ laṅgheti. Koci yantakena vic-
aranto nāma n’ atthi. Tato cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ dassana-kiccaṃ sādhentaṃ uppajjatīti (DA, 
I, 194). ‘vāyo-dhātu-viññattiṃ’ was emended ‘vāyo-dhātu viññattiṃ’ on the basis of the 
parallel passages in MA, I, 262; SA, III, 191; Vibh-a, 356.
65 Cf. Harvey 1993, 35, for the comparison of vāyo-dhātu with the modern concept of 
electrical discharge in the nerves. See also Killingley (2006, 103 endnote 15), who in-
terprets vāyu as a kind of shock, the motion or the kinetic energy.
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5.3 The Observation of the Action of Kamma (Sanskrit: Karman): 
A Faint Echo
During the exposition of the abhiññā called the ‘knowledge of de-
generation and ascent of beings’ (cutūpapātañāṇa), it is stated that, 
thanks to the divine eye (dibbacakkhu), the rebirth in an inferior 
or superior plane of existence according to kamma is observed (so 
dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkanta-mānusakena satte passati 
cavamāne upapajjamāne, hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate dug-
gate yathā-kammūpage satte pajānāti; D, I, 82). Now, it will be ar-
gued why this particular abhiññā might have connections with the 
Upaniṣads.
As previously stated, in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, during the 
oneiric state, a person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya) is able 
to perform activities that are beyond the common human capacities. 
The freedom of movement and the creative power of the mind found 
in this passage resemble the marvellous actions performed by a monk 
who experiences iddhis. However, within the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad’s 
account there is a detail that is less striking, but likewise interest-
ing. Therefore, in Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4.3.7-38 there is often men-
tion to the fact that the person made of consciousness, standing in 
the place between this world and the other world, sees both evils and 
joys (pāpmana ānandāṃś ca paśyati; BU 4.3.9) and later, indeed, it 
is repeated many times that this person has seen the merit (puṇya) 
and demerit (pāpa) (dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ; e.g. BU 4.3.15). The 
terms puṇya and pāpa, which have been translated as ‘merit’ and ‘de-
merit’, are a little controversial. As Bodewitz stated, “[i]n post-Ve-
dic texts in which puṇyam is mentioned together with pāpam, good 
and bad actions in general (and their resulting merits and demerits) 
are definitely meant” (2013, 44). This implies that the interpretation 
of puṇya and pāpa as ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’ is not valid for all passag-
es in the Vedic texts, but mainly for the post-Vedic texts. So, in spite 
of the fact that Bodewitz found some Upaniṣadic passages in which 
puṇya and pāpa refer to good and bad activities and their results (e.g. 
BU 3.2.13, cf. Bodewitz 2013, 47), he asserted that:
B[ṛhad]Ā[raṇyaka]U[paniṣad] 4, 3, 15; 4, 3, 22 and 4, 3, 34 have 
puṇyam and pāpam as the objects of an other verb than kar, name-
ly the verb ‘to see’. In the state of dreams one sees (i.e. experienc-
es) good and evil, which have nothing to do with moral distinc-
tions but refer to pleasant and unpleasant experiences. (Bodewitz 
2013, 47; square brackets added)
The Upaniṣadic verses quoted are part of the oneiric account. In this 
passage, Bodewitz interprets the verbs denoting ‘to see’ (in the cas-
es mentioned, it is used dṛṣṭvā, a gerund form from the root √dṛś) 
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with the meaning ‘to experience’. He does not really provide evi-
dence for this statement and, furthermore, the meaning ‘to experi-
ence’ does not appear in Monier-Williams’ Sanskrit-English Diction-
ary as an explanation for √dṛś (cf. SED, 491) and in the sub voce √paś 
it does not seem at all the primary meaning (cf. SED, 611). Howev-
er, the rendering ‘to experience’ actually seems to fit the context of 
the passage as it will be shown below. Bodewitz also stated that the 
good and evil experienced “have nothing to do with moral distinc-
tions but refer to pleasant and unpleasant experiences”, whereas the 
Upaniṣadic passage seems to indicate exactly the opposite, since it 
specifies that what one sees in that state does not follow him (sa yat 
tatra kiñcit paśyaty ananvāgatas tena bhavati; BU 4.3.15).66 There-
fore, analysing the Sanskrit text, it is possible to note that the vers-
es 4.3.15-767 repeat almost the same phrasing with reference to three 
different states:
1. the serenity (samprasāda, i.e. the mental state during the 
deep sleep);
2. the dream (svapna);
3. and the waking condition (buddhānta).
However, it is possible to note that the phrase “whatever he sees 
there, he is not followed by it” (sa yat tatra kiñcit paśyaty ananvāgatas 
tena bhavati) occurs only for the first two states that are related to 
the act of sleeping, whereas it does not occur in the third one, the 
waking state. This may indicate that whatever one ‘sees’ in the wak-
ing state, he is ‘followed’ (anvāgata) by it, whereas if he had been in 
the other two states, he would not have been followed (ananvāgata) 
by it. It would seem that actually the verb ‘to see’ may convey the 
meaning of ‘to experience’ (as Bodewitz stated), and that these ex-
periences have no results if they take place during sleep (i.e. not fol-
low), but they get results if they take place in the waking state (i.e. 
follow). So, the person made of consciousness sees/experiences ac-
tions that may or may not have results according to the state in which 
these actions are experienced (waking or sleeping state). In the Bud-
dhist text, the monk sees (passati) the different kinds of rebirths of 
66 He is not followed by merit and demerit: ananvāgataṃ puṇyenānanvāgataṃ pāpena 
(BU 4.3.22).
67 sa vā eṣa etasmin saṃprasāde ratvā caritvā dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca punaḥ 
pratinyāyaṃ pratiyony ādravati svapnāyaiva | sa yat tatra kiñcit paśyaty ananvāgatas 
tena bhavati | asaṅgo hy ayaṃ puruṣa iti | evam evaitat yājñavalkya | so ’haṃ bhaga-
vate sahasraṃ dadāmi | ata ūrdhvaṃ vimokṣāyaiva brūhīti || sa vā eṣa etasmin svapne 
ratvā caritvā dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca pāpaṃ ca punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyony ādravati 
buddhāntāyaiva | sa yat tatra kiñcit paśyaty ananvāgatas tena bhavati | asaṅgo hy ayaṃ 
puruṣa iti | evam evaitat yājñavalkya | so ’haṃ bhagavate sahasraṃ dadāmi | ata ūrdhvaṃ 
vimokṣāyaiva brūhīti || sa vā eṣa etasmin buddhānte ratvā caritvā dṛṣṭvaiva puṇyaṃ ca 
pāpaṃ ca punaḥ pratinyāyaṃ pratiyony ādravati svapnāntāyaiva. (BU 4.3.15-7)
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beings. On the one hand, there is the observation of actions merito-
rious and not (Upaniṣadic account), and, on the other hand, there is 
the observation of the results of the actions of others (Buddhist ac-
count). The action of seeing/experiencing (Sanskrit: paśyati; Pāli: pas-
sati) is an action that takes place in the mind in both the Upaniṣadic 
oneiric state and Buddhist account, but this does not imply that the 
experience is devoid of objectivity. Within the Upaniṣadic account, 
it is stated that the person made of consciousness sees/experiences 
merit and demerit in the dreamlike state and in deep sleep, as well 
as in the waking state. It seems from BU 2.1.18 that the oneiric ex-
perience is something that occurs inside the body, but, as W. Doni-
ger stated, “[t]he fact that the dream exists only inside the body of 
the dreamer does not, however, imply that it is unreal, as such a di-
chotomy (inside vs. outside, private vs. public) might imply in West-
ern thinking” (1984, 15).68 Within the Sāmaññaphalasutta’s exposi-
tion of the cutūpapātañāṇa, it is not clear how to develop the divine 
eye (dibbacakkhu), nevertheless it is clear that the action of the mind 
is implied (so evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe 
vigatūpakkilese mudu-bhūte kammaniye ṭhite ānejjappatte pubbe-
nivāsānussati-ñāṇāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti; D, I, 82). The 
instructions to perform this abhiññā are provided only by the later 
compendium of Buddhist doctrine called Visuddhimagga ‘The Path of 
Purification’. In this text (cf. Vism, 427-9), it is explained that one who 
wants to develop the divine eye should achieve the dwelling place of 
the access jhāna (upacārajjhānagocara) using the meditative object 
called kasiṇa, choosing one among the three kasiṇas of fire (tejas), 
white (odāta), and light (āloka), and should mentally extend it without 
getting the full absorption (appanā).69 Among these three kasiṇas, the 
light kasiṇa is the best for this kind of performance.70 The text con-
tinues stating that it is possible to see visible forms into the range 
of extension of the kasiṇa.71 The objects seen through the divine eye 
are probably mental images, which are as much real as the objects 
seen with the physical eye:
In this context, when this form – inside the belly, belonging to the 
heart-base (hadayavatthu), under the surface of the earth, beyond 
walls, mountains, and ramparts, or in another sphere of existence 
68 A recent overview concerning the concept of ‘dream’ into the Vedic texts is pro-
vided by Pellegrini (2011, 11-29) in his excellent PhD dissertation.
69 tejokasiṇaṃ odātakasiṇaṃ ālokakasiṇan ti imesu tīsu kasiṇesu aññataraṃ āsannaṃ 
kātabbaṃ; upacārajjhānagocaraṃ katvā vaḍḍhetvā upetabbaṃ, na tattha appanā 
uppādetabbā ti adhippāyo. (Vism, 427-8)
70 Imesu-ca pana tīsu ālokakasiṇaṃ yeva seṭṭhataraṃ. (Vism, 428)
71 Vaḍḍhitaṭṭhānassa anto yeva rūpagataṃ passitabbaṃ. (Vism, 428)
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(paracakkavāḷa) – which does not come into the range of percep-
tion of the fleshly eye of the monk, reaches the range of percep-
tion of the eye of knowledge (ñāṇacakkhu), and it is as seen with 
the fleshly eye; then the divine eye has arisen.72
In this regard, it is worth remembering that since in Buddhism the 
mind (manas) is considered a sense, namely the sixth sense, the na-
ture of the mind’s experience is not different from the other senso-
ry experiences.73
In both Upaniṣadic and Buddhist accounts, the observation/expe-
rience is mental, but it does not mean that it is not real. Moreover, in 
both accounts it seems that the karmic theory (definitely within the 
Buddhist account and most likely in the Upaniṣadic one) is involved. 
Finally, in order to support this hypothesis that would read a connec-
tion between the two accounts, the Author would like to highlight a 
couple of dichotomous elements present in both traditions.
Starting with the Buddhist exposition of the cutūpapātañāṇa, it is 
possible to note that through the divine eye (dibbacakkhu), the re-
birth of beings in an inferior or superior plane of existence according 
to the kamma is observed. The text provides a list of opposite pairs: 
cavamāne upapajjamāne, hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe sugate dug-
gate (D, I, 82). With this phrasing, it indicates the possibility of degen-
erating (cavamāna) in negative conditions (hīna, dubbaṇṇa, duggata), 
or ascending (upapajjamāna) in positive conditions (paṇīta, suvaṇṇa, 
sugata). The negative conditions par excellence are rebirths in hells, 
whereas the positive conditions are rebirths in heavens. The suffix 
-māna used to create the present passive participle of the verbs ca-
vati and upapajjati might indicate that the action occurs automati-
cally, and the beings involved are just passive subjects of the action. 
Therefore, the kamma is clearly understood as a sort of natural law, 
which acts automatically at the moment of death, leading to the fol-
lowing rebirth. It makes sense to consider the verb cavati as indicat-
ing a fall from one state to another74 and the verb upapajjati indicat-
ing an ascent towards more elevated states.75
72 Tattha yadā tassa bhikkhuno maṃsacakkhussa anāpāthagataṃ anto kucchigataṃ 
hadayavatthunissitaṃ heṭṭhā pathavītalanissitaṃ tirokuḍḍapabbatapākāragataṃ 
paracakkavāḷagatan ti idaṃ rūpaṃ ñāṇacakkhussa āpāthaṃ āgacchati, maṃsacakkhuno 
dissamānaṃ viya hoti, tadā dibbacakkhu uppannaṃ hoti. (Vism, 428-9)
73 Cf. Johansson 1969, 48; Clough [2010] 2011, 417; Clough 2012, 86. Johansson wrote 
about the abhiññās that “[s]ome of the supernatural forms of knowledge (abhiññā) may 
be understood as ideations interpreted as real” (1969, 48).
74 Cf. s.v. “cavati” in DOP, 125; BHSD, 226.
75 As stated by the PED (128) s.v. “upapajjati”, the etymology of upapajjati is a bit con-
troversial since it is not really clear if it derives from upa-√pad or from ud-√pad. The 
dictionary, therefore, highlights as upap- and upp- are almost written in the same way 
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Similar dichotomous elements are present in another Upaniṣadic 
passage (BU 2.1.16-20) that involves a person made of consciousness 
within the oneiric state. In this passage, it is stated that this per-
son uccāvacaṃ nigacchati (BU 2.1.18). Since the compound uccāvaca 
means high (ucca/uccā) and low (avaca) without specifying anything 
else; it is not immediately clear how to translate it. The expression 
‘high and low’ could refer to high and low regions (see, for example, 
Olivelle 1998, 63), states, worlds. However, it could also indicate 
high and low conditions (e.g. in the Śaṅkara’s comment on this com-
pound: utāpy uccāvacam uccaṃ ca devatvādy avacaṃ ca tiryaktvādi, 
uccam ivāvacam iva ca nigacchati; BUBh ad 2.1.18).76 In spite of pos-
sible translations, and likewise the Buddhist account, it is possible 
to observe that it involves a movement or a shift and a settlement (ni-
√gam) in a higher situation or in a lower one. It may be possible that 
these two translations are not mutually exclusive because in order 
to visit another realm one could assume the life conditions of this 
realm. This seems to occur sometimes in the Buddhist texts, which 
state often that one of the characteristics of some gods in certain 
realms is to have a body made of mind (manomaya) (cf. e.g. D, I, 17), 
and so no wonder in S, V, 282 it is stated that the Buddha can visit 
the world of Brahmā with both the physical body and the body made 
of mind (manomaya).
Drawing conclusions from this analysis, it is possible to state that:
1. Buddhist and Upaniṣadic accounts seem to involve the kar-
mic theory, although in the Buddhist account it is more evi-
dent than in the Upaniṣadic passages.
2. The action of ‘seeing’ is involved in both traditions and the 
experience is as much mental as real. Seeing rebirth accord-
ing to kamma with the divine eye is not very different from 
seeing merit and demerits in the dream; both are actions that 
take place in the mind, one during meditation and one during 
sleep. In these cases, the action of seeing is a mental action, 
which, on the one hand, implies being a spectator, and, on the 
other hand, implies an all-pervasive experience.
3. Similar dichotomous elements are present in both traditions. 
The Buddhist text indicates the possibility of degenerating 
(cavamāna) in negative conditions (hīna, dubbaṇṇa, duggata), 
or ascending (upapajjamāna) in positive conditions (paṇīta, 
in Sinhalese script. In any case, both prefixes could indicate an upward direction (cf. 
s.vv. “upa-” and “ud-” respectively in PED, 123 and 118).
76 The text formatting has been slightly edited. This interpretation could be also co-
herent with the fact that the previous phrase states that the person made of conscious-
ness may become a great king or a great brahmin (i.e. he experiences a very good and 
high condition): tad uteva mahārājo bhavaty uteva mahābrāhmaṇaḥ | utevoccāvacaṃ ni-
gacchati (BU 2.1.18).
Annali di Ca’ Foscari. Serie orientale e-ISSN 2385-3042
55, 2019, 227-264 ISSN 1125-3789
256
suvaṇṇa, sugata). The Upaniṣadic account involves a move-
ment or a shift and a settlement (nigacchati) in high (ucca/
uccā) and low (avaca) regions, states, worlds, or conditions 
(uccāvacaṃ nigacchati; BU 2.1.18).
6 Conclusion
In line with the growing interest in the study of extraordinary capac-
ities within the Indian traditions, this paper has (hopefully) shown 
the importance of the comparison between the Buddhist and Vedic 
texts with reference to the widespread Buddhist notions of iddhi and 
abhiññā. At first, the interpretation and translation of these two terms 
have been discussed, and despite that the Author has expressed his 
preferences with regard to the rendering of the terms into English, he 
does not consider his argumentations as conclusive. In fact, it should 
always be remembered that a translated word is consistently drawn 
from a context and it is translated in order to satisfy a specific au-
dience. Although a certain degree of arbitrariness is acknowledged, 
however, there could always be better or worse translations inasmuch 
as the context of use of the translated term and the target audience 
are taken into account. Therefore, translations such as ‘psychic pow-
er’ and ‘higher knowledge’, for the terms iddhi and abhiññā respec-
tively, may fit the context in which they stand for capacities developed 
through the meditative practice and satisfy a broad audience that may 
not consist solely of scholars. Nevertheless, translations such as ‘su-
perhuman power’ or ‘success’ for the term iddhi can not be ruled out, 
and according to the authors’ preference and/or to the context and au-
dience, could be certainly adopted.
Thereafter, in order to better understand the concepts of iddhi and 
abhiññā, some connections with the Vedic texts have been analysed. At 
first, the thorny problem concerning the involvement of the body made 
of mind (manomaya-kāya) in the execution of the extraordinary capac-
ities was taken into account. Although many scholars sustained that 
these kinds of marvellous performances were thought to be performed 
through the body made of mind, no one provided strong evidence to 
support this thesis. A glance into the Vedic texts that deal with similar 
topics has shown that it could be reasonable to believe that the body 
made of mind is involved in these kinds of extraordinary performanc-
es. However, it should be stressed that this does not mean that the use 
of the body made of mind is mandatory to perform these extraordinary 
acts. It is attested, for instance in the Saṃyuttanikāya, that the Buddha 
was able to go to the Brahmā world (i.e. the last iddhi) with both the 
physical body (cātumahābhūtikena kāyena, lit. the body composed of the 
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four great elements) and the body made of mind (manomayena kāyena).77
The investigation within the Vedic texts continued with the analy-
sis of the term ‘divine’ (Pāli: dibba; Sanskrit: divya/daiva) since it oc-
curs in the description of some abhiññās. It turned out that this use 
of ‘divine’ is still in some ways connected with the Vedic one, but it 
certainly shows a development (started already in the Upaniṣads) ac-
cording to which a faculty is called ‘divine’ when it performs a func-
tion in a way that is beyond the normal or average use. Within the Ve-
dic thought, all faculties were connected with a divine power, whereas 
in Buddhism it seems that this connection with a power able to affect 
the reality was maintained only by the mind, which, once purified, 
can improve the range of action of the normal faculties (i.e. seeing and 
hearing). The later Theravāda exegesis has indeed developed a mech-
anistic explanation in order to explain the sensorial process (e.g the 
process of seeing), showing that there was a trend of a progressive 
abandonment of the idea that there is a magical or divine power be-
hind the functioning of the senses (and other faculties). Although it is 
beyond the aims of the present discussion, it is nonetheless interest-
ing to note that there seems to be a connection with the Max Weber 
concept of ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Entzauberung der Welt).78
Finally, the abhiññā called the ‘knowledge of degeneration and as-
cent of beings’ (cutūpapātañāṇa) was compared with a couple of ac-
counts involving the oneiric state in the Upaniṣads (i.e. BU 4.3.7-38 
and 2.1.16-20). Some similarities were recovered79 and this fact might 
77 Cf. abhijānāti nu kho bhante Bhagavā iddhiyā manomayena kāyena Brahmalokam 
upasaṅkamitā […] abhijānāti kho pana bhante Bhagavā iminā cātumahābhūtikena kāyena 
iddhiyā Brahmalokam upasaṅkamitā (S, V, 282).
78 “Thus the growing process of intellectualization and rationalization does not im-
ply a growing understanding of the conditions under which we live. It means some-
thing quite different. It is the knowledge or the conviction that if only we wished to un-
derstand them we could do so at any time. It means that in principle, then, we are not 
ruled by mysterious, unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in prin-
ciple control everything by means of calculation. That in turn means the disenchant-
ment of the world” (Weber [1864-1920] 2004, 12-3). In this regard, it is worth noting 
that the Buddhist exegetical account in which the function of seeing is described in a 
very mechanistic way occurs within sections that are related to the practice of mind-
fulness (sati), just as in DA, I, 194 that is part of a section entitled by the editor of the 
commentary (Mr. Rhys Davids) as ‘sati-sampajaññaṃ’, or in MA, I, 262 that is part of 
the comment on the Satipaṭṭhānasutta (M, 10). Rephrasing the Max Weber’s statement 
from a Buddhist point of view we can say that: the bodily and mental process through 
which the function of seeing is performed is not part of our average awareness under 
which we live. But it is a kind of knowledge that if only we wished to have we could get 
it at any time. It means that in principle, then, we are not ruled by mysterious, unpre-
dictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in principle be aware of everything 
by means of mindfulness.
79 In this regard, this case study is in line with the findings of Black (2011), who spot-
ted similarities between the narratives involving the Buddhist character of Ambaṭṭha 
and the Upaniṣadic character of Śvetaketu.
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justify further speculations. For instance, could there be a connec-
tion between the Upaniṣadic oneiric state and the Buddhist medita-
tion? It can be argued that the answer might depend on the sources 
consulted. Glancing at the Theravāda exegesis, it would seem evident 
that the action of dreaming and the meditative absorption ( jhāna) 
would involve a different mental activity and so they would seem in no 
way compatible.80 On the other hand, the Upaniṣadic accounts of the 
oneiric state have some details that cannot go unnoticed. For exam-
ple, in BU 4.3.7 the person made of consciousness (vijñānamaya), able 
to move within the oneiric state, moves across the worlds (this and 
the oneiric one) and contemplates them (ubhau lokāv anusaṃcarati 
dhyāyatīva). The verb dhyāyati, which has been loosely translated as 
‘contemplates’, is from a root √dhyai, just as the Buddhist meditative 
absorption state is called jhāna, which is in Sanskrit dhyāna, and so 
is from the same root. Remarkable is also the fact that extraordi-
nary capacities are displayed by the person made of consciousness 
in the Upaniṣadic oneiric state and that in the Buddhist texts a body 
made of mind (manomaya-kāya) could be involved in similar kind of 
extraordinary performances.
In conclusion, the comparison of the Buddhist notions of iddhi and 
abhiññā has shown that Buddhism did not come out from impenetra-
ble darkness, but it was immersed into a rich environment of ideas. 
Buddhism, just as any historical phenomenon, is in dialogue with the 
historical period in which it lives, is influenced and tries to influence 
its environment and, therefore, it is part of a historical picture, which 
developed in many ways during the flowing of time.
80 A comparison between dreaming and meditating is provided by Harvey (1995, 
162-4). Without going into the details of the articulated Theravāda theory of mental 
process, it is possible to state that during the dream there is a rapid alternation of the 
passive state of consciousness called bhavaṅga and the state of javana, often translat-
ed as ‘impulsion’, whereas during the meditative absorption there is an uninterrupt-
ed sequence of javanas.
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